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Abstract 
 
Julian Simon has stated, in many of his recent publications, that population 
growth, although reducing income per capita in the short run through capital 
dilution, increases the rate of growth of that same income per capita in the long 
run (steady state) through technical progress brought about by the increased 
rates of invention and innovation caused by a bigger population. This paper 
intends to measure empirically the length of time needed to achieve that steady 
state, through the experience of three industrialised countries, by means of a 
time-series analysis based on the models presented by Simon in his most recent 
work (1986). 
 
 
 
 
Much has been said since the days of Malthus about population growth and its 
influence over economic growth and development. Most of it, however, has 
remained at a very basic level of discussion or, at the most, at the level of simple 
comparisons of statistical data. Malthus himself based his work on a rather 
intuitive approach, very much influenced by his own personal beliefs and moral 
principles. No one could have expected much more from him, given the scarcity 
and poor quality of the statistical data at his time. 
 
Without improving very much on the quality of the analysis, the debate gained 
momentum in the 1970s, first with the catastrophic predictions of the Club of 
Rome (1972) –which were based on erroneous estimates of the world’s reserves of 
natural resources- and later with Global 2000 (1979), the report on population 
issues and other related matters delivered to the President of the United States, 
which renewed the pessimistic outlook first depicted by the Club of Rome. It has 
since become usual that individual countries adopt their own population policies, 
as part of an integral development policy. The best known cases are those of India 
and China. 
 
The counterattack to the pessimistic approach on population growth has been led 
by Julian L Simon, who has been arguing for more than a decade that population 
growth has not been systematically treated as an economic variable, thereby 
ignoring some of its effects on the economic environment. He is aware of the fact 
that population growth, per se, causes a reduction in income per capita in the short 
run, both due to the distribution of the same production among more consumers 
(consumption effect) and to the dilution of capital among more workers 
(production effect). But –his argument goes on-, this is only a static and partial 
effect. As years go by, the increased population is capable of increasing the stock 
of useful knowledge and technology at a much faster pace than that of population 
itself. This process leads to an increased productivity per worker and, therefore, to 
a higher income per capita. 
 
Where is the trick? In his most recent publication, Theory of Population and Economic 
Growth” (1986), Professor Simon builds up a model of economic growth in which 
he endogenises technological progress, by relating it to population growth. Most 
of the growth models developed up to now, since the early developments of 
Harrod and Domar, include technical progress –either embodied or disembodied- 
as an exogenous independent variable, to account for the economic growth that 
cannot be explained by capital or labour alone. In this sense, “technical progress” 
has been the name given to a variable which economists have not been able to 
explain, but which adequately accounts for the leftovers of economic growth (“the 
measure of our ignorance”, in the words of a well-known author). Professor Simon 
gives a detailed description of how technical progress is achieved and how 
population size and growth influence it. 
 
This paper does not intend to prove or disprove Professor Simon’s theory. Much 
more and better statistical data are needed for such a task. So the theory implied 
by Simon’s model –described later in the paper- is taken here for granted. My 
modest intention is to try to give some hints as to how long the period needed to 
achieve Simon’s steady state might be. There has been some discussion going on 
about it, still at a very preliminary stage. Here, statistical data on three 
industrialised countries –France, Japan and the United Kingdom- are used in 
trying to unveil the answer to such a crucial question. 
 
 
1) The intuition and the facts behind Simon’s theory 
 
 
The claim by Malthus that population increases in a geometric progression, while 
resources and food supplies do so only in an arithmetical progression has long 
since been disproved. It might be true that populations of certain regions or 
countries have grown in a geometric progression during a certain period of time. 
But that rate of growth is subject to cycles, due to several causes. One of them is 
the change in general welfare, which is explained by the demographic transition 
theory. It is also subject to all kinds of checks throughout history (epidemic 
diseases, wars, natural disasters, etc). Take the case of Egypt. Its population has 
grown at very high rates at least during two periods over the last two thousand 
years (250-500ad and 1800-1950ad). And yet, the number of Egyptians was barely 
the same in 1950 as it was in the year 500bc. 
 
On the other hand, that food supplies or any kind of resource needed for 
production trail behind population growth could not be sustained seriously by 
anyone, given the evidence that suggests otherwise. The world’s food production 
per capita increased 28% in the period of 1950-1977, one of the periods of highest 
population growth on record. Only Africa has failed to meet the growing food 
demands of its population in recent years, due to a host of natural disasters and 
civil war problems coupled with inadequate government policies. 
 
The alleged scarcity of natural resources is denied by the secular downward trend 
of commodity prices. Take anyone of them –even oil- over the period of the last 
100 or 150 years; their real prices have all come down, sometimes in proportions of 
30 to 1. This can be roughly explained by the fact that higher prices induce the 
discovery of new reserves and/or the substitution of resources in consumption or 
production. In this last case, the adoption of a new technology ensures an 
increased production or lower prices or both. 
 
Given these facts, how can someone ever think that population growth is 
detrimental to economic growth and development? Very simple: by everyday 
experience. People live in a certain period in time (now and perhaps ten years 
back in the past and ten years into the future), within certain boundaries (town, 
region or country) and surrounded by their own personal circumstances and 
fellow citizens. If the population in a certain area at a certain moment in time starts 
to increase very quickly, any member of that community will see his own 
circumstances change in a way that tends to limit him somehow (the discomfort of 
more crowded buses or underground trains, greater pollution, higher prices due 
to greater demand, etc). He will experience the immediate consequences of 
population growth, which impose a limitation on him. He will not be able to see 
its long-run benefits - the ones we have discussed earlier, on the production side, 
and more and better facilities available to the community, brought about by a 
higher demand concentrated in the same area. 
 
But, what sort of logic lies behind the fact that an increase in population may imply 
enhanced welfare for all in the long run, even though it obviously constrains 
resources in the short run? The idea is fairly simple. Think about productive 
resources; land, capital and labour. Is land of any use if there is no labour? 
Someone could say that in an absolutely mechanised productive system, 
production could be obtained without the intervention of labour. Right; but, could 
capital have existed, in the first place, without the intervention of labour? 
Therefere, we must conclude, labour is the primary and most important factor of 
production. Moreover, taking the argument to the limit, it is the only proper factor 
of production, since the others derive either its existence or its use from it. And if 
we think about the demand side of the economy; what use would any production 
—and therefore any factor of production— have, if there were no people whose 
demand needed te be satisfied? 
 
This is the core of the problem we are dealing with. This is what Professor Simon 
has had in mind when he has stated that man is “the ultimate resource”. Going a 
bit deeper into the meaning of this expression, Simon has said that the physical 
finiteness of resources is overcome by the infinite scope of man’s imagination. In 
this sense, resources are not finite from an economic point of view, because they 
are subject to the infinite potential of discovery, invention and technological 
progress which the human mind can achieve. A philosopher might object to the 
use of the term “infinite” in this context. My interpretation of Simon’s use of the 
word is not one of absolute infiniteness, but rather of an apparent one, in the sense 
that man himself cannot exhaust his own capabilities, the scope of possible human 
progress. 
 
This idea, as simple as it stands, is a good start for a serious research into the 
economic consequences of population growth. It is bound to gain wide acceptance, 
due mainly to its simplicity and obvious adequacy to reality. To quote the World 
Bank —in its World Development Report 1984—, “...there is little doubt that the 
key to economic growth is people, and through people the advance of human 
knowledge”. 
 
 
2) The transmission mechanism 
 
 
Simon starts by collecting some evidence which might lead him to a restatement of 
the neoclassical growth theory. Among other facts, he mentions: 
 
i) There are more people alive today than in earlier epochs, and yet most 
people are better off in most material ways than in the past. 
 
ii) The last 300 years, over which the western world has seen the most rapid 
population growth in history, have also been the period of the most rapid 
economic growth in history. 
 
iii) Over the period 1950—1975, while population has grown very rapidly in 
LDC’s, income per capita has also grown very rapidly in those countries. 
 
iv) Throughout human history, technical progress has been faster when 
population size has been larger (he refers to the cases of Ancient Greece and 
Ancient Rome at this point). 
 
v) Cross-section contemporary data have also shown that scientific activity is 
greater in those countries where the population is larger. 
 
According to him, iv) and v) constitute the most important stylised fact that the 
theory of population and economic growth must fit to. On these grounds, he 
decides to incorporate technical progress as an endogenous variable into the 
analysis. Bringing this element into the model implies that the level of technology 
that is combined with labour and capital in the production function must be 
influenced directly or indirectly by population, rather than being an exogenous 
function of time’s passage, as it has been traditional in growth theory. The key 
element in the analysis is that technical change responds in various ways to 
population size, density and growth. 
 
In trying to explain the process of invention, Simon says that inventions arise from all 
the possible combinations of ideas that people might have. But, how much 
productive knowledge can we expect from additional people? Under the very 
conservative assumption that each new person in the labour force (L) produces only 
one idea, on average, by successfully combining two old ideas (therefore excluding 
any idea arising from the observation of the world), the stock of knowledge at any 
given moment in time would be defined by 
                       t - 1        
 Mt =  ∑       Js  +  Jt         (1) 
           s = - ∞ 
 Mt : number of ideas discovered until period t 
 Js   :  number of ideas discovered in period s 
 
The potential number of new ideas that might be discovered at time t is (dropping 
the time subscript of M) : 
  
 Nt ≈ M ( M – 1) – M ,        (2) 
 
and the number of new ideas actually discovered in a given period t will be 
 
 Jt = Lt p(new) p(nondup) 
     = Lt {[ M (M – 1) – M ] /[ M (M – 1)]} { 1 – [ Lt /Nt ]}    (3) 
  
 p(new) : probability of discovering an idea that hasn’t been discovered before 
p(nondup) : probability of discovering an idea that isn’t being concurrently 
discovered by another person 
 
The important point to make in this analysis is that the number of new ideas 
discovered in t is a positive function of L, as can be seen from the following 
rearrangement of (3) : 
 
 Jt = Lt [ (Nt – Lt) /Nt ] p(new)  =  [ ( Lt Nt – Lt2) /Nt ] p(new)   (4) 
 
Intuitively (although it can be proved), we can see that Nt > Lt, and therefore 
p(nondup) is positive. Moreover, p(nondup) will increase each year, because in 
successive years each new idea can be combined with an ever larger number of 
already existing ideas, and will asymptotically approach 1. P(new) will also do so, 
since it is increasing in M, but it makes no difference to the analysis. This implies 
that there are increasing returns in technology creation from additional people, 
approaching constant returns in the long run, and suggests that additional people 
imply additional knowledge, without limits. 
 
Simon also presents an alternative explanation of how population growth might 
affect economic growth via an increase in technical knowledge, by means of a 
“learning-by-doing” model. The conclusions are qualitatively the same, so we will 
not go into it here. 
 
 
3) The basic model stated  
 
 
The main model, which is based on an earlier one by Phelps (1966), is a steady-
state growth model in which technical progress is included as an endogenous 
variable. 
 
The first assumption is that technical change is proportional to the number of 
researchers, and these are proportional to the labour force (L) , as expressed in the 
first equation : 
 
 At – At-1 = a At-1∆ Lt-1γ  ,   ∆ , γ  < 1  ,    (5)  
     where A is the level of technology. 
 
Then, the model is expanded to allow for other independent variables to enter the 
analysis: 
 
 At – At-1 = b Lt-1γ  At-1∆  Yt-1Φ  (Y/L)t-1Ψ  ,       Φ, Ψ < 1,   (6) 
 where Y is the level of income. 
 
Yt-1 reflects the fact that bigger economies have more technical progress, and (Y/L) 
is a proxy for variables such as the level of education and training. 
 
This last equation can also be expressed as (dropping time subscripts again) : 
 
 At – At-1 = b Lµ A∆ Yε  ,        (7) 
 where µ = γ – Ψ 
   ε = Φ + Ψ 
 
The output (Y) and savings (S) equation of the model are the following: 
 
 Yt =  Ktα  ( At Lt )β          (8) 
 St  =  s Yt-1  ,                  1 > s > 0      (9) 
 K :  capital 
 
Next, the exogenous labour force growth: 
 
 Lt = Lt-1 + h Lt-1 ,                  (10) 
 where h is a control variable in the analysis. 
 
In the steady-state equilibrium (where the dots represent proportional changes per 
period of time): 
  .   .   .   . 
 A = ga  ,  L = gL , K = gk ,  Y = gy              (11) 
     (all constant) 
 
Manipulating equation 7, we get 
        .        .   .        .      . 
 (1/A) (dA /dt)  =  µ L + (∆ – 1)A + ε Y  =  0               (12) 
 
So, 
 ga  =  [ ε /(1 – ∆) ] gy  +  [ µ /(1 – ∆ ) ] gL                (13) 
 
Then, equations 8, 9 and 10 and the long-run equilibrium conditions can be reduced 
into the following equation: 
 
 ga = [ (1 – α) / β ] gy - gL                  (14) 
 
From here, we can determine the equilibrium values of gy and ga : 
 
 gy = {[ 1 – ∆ + µ ]  / [ ((1 – α) /β) (1 – ∆) – ε ]} gL                          (15) 
 
 ga = {[((1 – α) /β) µ + ε] / [ ((1 – α) /β) (1 – ∆) – ε ]} gL              (16) 
 
For the special case of constant returns to scale in the production function, α + β = 1, 
and we get 
 
 gy = [ ( 1 – ∆ + µ ) / ( 1 – ∆ – ε ) ] gL                (17) 
 
 ga = [ ( µ + ε ) / ( 1 – ∆ – ε ) ] gL                  (18) 
 
The equilibrium value of the growth rate of per-worker income would be 
 
 gy/L = [ ( µ + ε ) / ( 1 – ∆ – ε ) ] gL = g                (19) 
 
This is equal to gy/p , where y/p is per-capita income, if the growth rate of the labour 
force is the same as that of the population (P). 
 
Consistence with the equilibrium conditions of the model requires that µ + ε > 0. 
Also, the denominator must be positive, because otherwise there would be no 
equilibrium with positive growth rates of L, A and Y. Furthermore, some simulation 
calculations show that, for all initial values of  A-dot , Y-dot  > 0 , the condition  ∆ + ε > 
1 causes the system to explode because dA/dt and dY/dt are positive. 
 
The previous results imply that there is a positive effect of population growth on 
income-per-capita growth in the steady-state long run. The magnitude of this effect 
would depend on the values of ε , µ and ∆ (the income, labour and technology 
elasticities of technical change). In simulations, Simon has used values of 1/3, 1/6 
and 1/3 for these parameters. With these values, our model would tell us that the 
steady-state growth of income per capita would be 3/2 times as big as the growth of 
population. 
 
The model just described presents the unrealistic feature of an ever-increasing rate of 
growth of income per capita as the rate of growth of population increases. In other 
words, faster population growth would imply a faster equilibrium rate of growth of 
the standard of living, without limit, which is -to say the least- “unaesthetic” (to put it 
in Simon’s words). Simon goes on, then, to correct the model, by assuming that the 
rate of adoption of technology becomes, at some stage, negatively influenced by 
population size or the rate of population growth. With this new, modified model -
which I will not state here-, he arrives to the conclusion that the rate of growth of 
income per capita converges asymptotically to a long-run fixed value, whatever the 
rate of growth of population.  With the same assumptions for the parameter values as 
before, he finds out that income-per-capita growth would converge to 3% at very 
high rates of population growth. For population growth rates lower than 4%, it 
would always grow (this would be the case for the vast majority of the countries of 
the world today), except under very restrictive assumptions. In summary, the rate of 
growth of income per capita would be either growing or converging to its steady-
state high-population-growth value –in this case 3%- as the population growth rate 
increases; it will go over this value only under very special circumstances and, if it 
did, it will never  go below that value as the rate of growth of population increases. 
 
The modified model still supports the main thesis that population growth has a 
positive effect on the steady-state rate of growth of income per capita, and this is the 
thesis that we are postulating throughout the rest of this paper. 
 
 
4) What can the experience of some industrialised countries say about Simon’s 
steady state? 
 
 
In this section, we take the cases of three industrialised countries –France, Japan and 
the United Kingdom-, and try to investigate, on the basis of Simon’s main model, the 
length of time that it would take for a country to start benefitting from population 
growth. These three countries have all undergone different industrialisation 
processes, with different initial populations and different cultural patterns, and, 
therefore, we could not expect a priori to get similar results for all of them. 
 
In dealing with the problem, we have extended Simon’s model to allow for the 
possibility of independent variables affecting the growth of income per capita not via 
population growth but on their own. Our complete model is the following: 
 
 gy/p = α + β gp + γ ri + δ re + ε du                 (20) 
 
  gy/p  :  rate of growth of income per capita 
  gp       :  rate of growth of population 
  ri :  rate of investment, defined as (I/Y) 
  re :  rate of education, defined as (S/P), where S stands for students 
            du         :  change in the rate of unemployment, expressed as a percentage    
of the labour force 
 
For constructing gy/p, the GDP was used for France and the UK, but for Japan it was 
necessary to take the GNP, since there existed no series of GDP for the whole of the 
period under study. For the rate of investment, we defined investment as gross fixed 
capital formation plus change in stocks. As for the rate of education, the number of 
students S is the sum of all students in primary, secondary and higher education in 
each period of time. For the UK, re was constructed as the rate of education in Great 
Britain, due to the lack of data for the whole nation during the relevant period. 
 
The unavailability and, sometimes, unreliability of the existing statistical data have 
constrained our time series to a length of 86 years in the case of population growth 
(1900-1985) and 40 years at the most for income and investment. These constraints 
determined the size of the other time series. For a list of the basic data used, see the 
Appendix. 
 
For the purpose of running the regressions, we have transformed the data into 
moving averages of five years, in order to smooth the trends of the series. This 
method proved to have a positive effect on the goodness of fit of the equations. But 
the tradeoff was the loss of four observations in each series. In the end, we were left 
with 30 observations (1956-1985) for each regression. This allowed for lags of up to 50 
years for population growth, 20 years for the rate of education (unrestricted) and 10 
years for the rate of investment. 
 
As it stands, with lagged values of population growth, investment and education, 
our model looks very much like a production function for the whole economy. For 
the sake of completeness (and theoretical consistency), we have added the change in 
the rate of unemployment as independent variable to account for slack demand in 
some periods, during which the productive capacity in the economy was not used to 
its full. 
 
The main question, in the analysis that follows, is : How long will it take for 
population growth, either through creation of productive knowledge or any other 
mechanism (we will not inquire into the transmission mechanism here), to overcome 
or, at least, start to offset, the negative effects of capital dilution and increased 
consumption on income per capita? 
 
a) The case of France 
 
We have started, in every case, by trying as many lags as possible -within a 
reasonable range- for every independent variable, putting a lower limit of 15 on the 
degrees of freedom. In this case, however, we have only tested 3 lags for ri , because 
the sample was not large enough.  
 
The first equation in Table 1 has a very good fit, as it ought to be. Unfortunately, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic doesn’t tell us very much with so many independent 
variables. It is possible that there be autocorrelation of first order, although not so 
likely, since the number is rather close to 2. The most significant variable here is du , 
which has the expected sign. Other significant variables at the 5% significance level 
are gp(-20), gp(-30) -just-, ri(-1) and re(-15), but these last two do not have the expected 
sign. Overall, it seems to make sense for gp and du , but not for re and ri . 
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In the second equation, we have eliminated the constant and thus gained one degree 
of freedom. The RSS doesn’t change very much ; also a good fit . The pattern is very 
similar to that of equation 1, with almost all the variables gaining in significance. In 
general, it should be preferred to equations 1. 
 
In equations 3 and 4 we have only included the lags of re and ri that, having the 
expected sign, seem most significant. Equation 3 is a very good fit, with an R2 that is 
very similar to the one of equation 1. The D-W statistic is better, with autocorrelation 
unlikely. Still, an odd result is the insignificance of ri . Equation 4, without a constant, 
is not an improvement. 
 
In the rest of the equations, we have taken the lag of gp that, having the sign we are 
looking for, looks like the most significant one. Equations 5 and 6 look excellent, 
except for the lack of significance of re , but equation  5 is affected by autocorrelation. 
Equation 7 corrects (6) for the possibility of autocorrelation of first order ; there is 
little change in the significance of the variables. As there is little difference in the RSS 
between similar equations with and without a constant, we run all the rest of the 
regressions without a constant, in order to gain one degree of freedom. When you 
take away du , as in equations 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, the equation loses 
significance immediately. Equations with only one independent variable, like (17) 
and (18), are useless, considering that the total sum of squares in this sample is 46. 
Very good equations are also (10), (11), (12) and (13), which tell as that education and 
investment are two possible alternative causes of economic growth, apart from 
population growth. Some equations have been transformed to AR1 processes, to 
allow for the possibility of autocorrelation of first order. 
 
With respect to population growth, the best fits show us significant positive 
parameters for 40-year lags of gp . Moreover, the case of France also shows possible 
positive effects of gp with a lag of only 10 years. The capital-dilution and excess-
demand effects would be dominant only between 20 and 30 years after the 
population increase, and the positive effects would start dominating after 40 years. 
 
b) The case of Japan 
 
This case should particularly attract our attention, since both economic growth and 
population growth have been significantly higher in Japan than in most European 
countries over the period studied. 
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The equation with all the variables and lags is again an excellent fit ; autocorrelation 
is unlikely. Negative and positive parameters for gp alternate, but none of them is 
significant. Another odd thing is that all the parameters for ri are negative, except for 
the 3-year lag, which is not significant anyway. The variable du , as always, is clearly 
significant, and re has two very significant lags for the expected sign. Equation 2 
eliminates the constant, but the fit clearly deteriorates. It shows only positive effects 
from population growth, which is rather unlikely. 
 
Equation 3 is not a bad fit, but autocorrelation is very likely. Here we have taken the 
most significant lags –among the ones with the expected sign- for ri and re . Equation 
4 is similar to (3), but without constant. The fit isn’t so good. 
 
In the rest of the equations, we try to eliminate some lags and some variables, 
without very satisfactory results for gp . What can be seen throughout is the 
importance of re in this case, which always appears significant with a lag of ten years. 
We might conclude that in a country like Japan, with few natural resources, investing 
in people seems to be an especially good policy. Another interesting point to make is 
that eliminating du does not affect so much –as in the case of France for example- the 
goodness of fit. This is due to the fact that unemployment has hardly changed over 
the last 35 years in Japan, particularly if we measure that change by western 
standards. 
 
For the purpose of our investigation, we should stick to equation 1, which is the best 
fit. We certainly wouldn’t be able to tell when do the positive effects of population 
growth become dominant. But what looks very likely is that the negative effects are 
dominant –if at all- only during the very first years after the population increase. 
 
c) The case of the United Kingdom 
 
The UK would seem, at first, an unattractive case, due to the sluggishness of both its 
population and economic growth over the period under study. And yet it is bound to 
show very clear and interesting results. 
 
Equations 1 and 2 are good fits, as expected; but not as good as were the equations 
for France and Japan with all the variables and lags. In equations 3 and 4, we have 
chosen lags for re and ri , but none of the variables, except du, looks very significant. 
The fit is not bad; probably better for the equation without a constant. 
Autocorrelation is not very likely. The most significant positive value for the 
coefficient of gp is given by the 40-year lag, so we adopt this lag for the rest of the 
equations. 
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Equation 5 still doesn’t show us very significant coefficients. Eliminating the 
constants, as in equation 6, gives significance to gp and re , while still maintaing a 
good fit. 
 
Equations 7 to 15 are all very interesting, because they show us the relative 
importance of the different explanatory variables, with good fits throughout . (7) and 
(8) show us that re is significant, but ri is not . When we eliminate ri , as in (9) and (10), 
re increases its significance notoriously. On the other hand, if we eliminate re and 
maintain ri , as in (11) and (12), it is ri which looks very significant, although not as 
significant as re in (9) and (10). This shows us, the same as in the case of France, that 
education and investment are alternative possible causes of growth. gp remains 
significant throughout this process. If we eliminate it , as in (13) and (14), the 
significance of re is increased and the coefficient of ri is negative, but not significantly. 
This indicates that re might be acting as a proxy for gp , which is logical, if we 
consider that re measures the “quality” of the people, as compared to the amount of 
people, measured by gp . 
 
The rest of the equations are not very good fits, except for (17), which tells us that if 
only two variables were to explain economic growth, they would be re and du . 
 
In summary, we could say that in this case, although gp doesn’t look very significant 
throughout, it seems likely that positive effects of gp on gy/p will start to dominate 
after 40 years of the population increase. 
 
 
5) Summary and conclusions 
 
 
We have tried to measure the amount of time that separates population growth from 
its beneficial effect over economic growth, as described in the models of  Julian 
Simon. The task has not been easy, due to the poor quality of the statistical data 
available, and is far from accomplished. This paper aims to be a first step in that 
direction . 
 
It is very clear that the analysis has many limitations. To mention one, we are 
assuming that, if population growth affects economic growth in the way Simon 
describes, technological transfer is not very significant. Otherwise, population growth 
in one country could affect economic growth in others –most probably this happens 
to a considerable extent . This possibility is not ruled out by Simon’s theory; only by 
the type of empirical analysis carried out in this paper. 
 
 
 
This econometric analysis is just a first attempt to point out certain relevant features 
of the process of economic growth of some countries; specifically France, Japan and 
the UK . I am sure it can be developed in many more directions and answer many 
questions which here are left unanswered. 
 
One of the questions which might arise is about the length of time it would take for 
the positive effects of population growth to offset the previous negative effects, and 
therefore start rendering dividends, to put it in accounting terms. I will try to give 
some hints towards the answer. If we take the case of France, for example, we could 
work with equation 3, which is the best among the ones with all the lags for gp and 
the best lags for re and ri . If we calculate the effects of gp over gy/p , we find out that 
we would be better off after 40 years with a positive population growth than with 
zero population growth. The improvement in the case of France –with gp of only 
about 0.5%- is very small, but it will be higher the higher is gp . For Japan and the UK 
–taking their equations 3 and 4, respectively-, the result that we are looking for works 
out to be between 40 and 50 years. 
 
Another question left unanswered refers to the measurement of the length of time 
during which population growth affects economic growth, before its effects die out. If 
we knew this, we would be able to measure the total effect of population growth over 
economic growth. I am afraid, though, that many years will have to pass before the 
statistical data permit to carry out this type of analysis. 
 
Nevertheless, some clear conclusions can be drawn from the analysis carried out in 
this paper. First, that one can detect positive effects of population growth over 
economic growth before 50 years, and sometimes as early as within ten years, as we 
have seen in some cases. Second, the model presented by Professor Simon needs to 
be extended for the purpose of empirical analysis. We have seen that the model with 
only one independent variable shows very little econometric significance, for the 
cases analysed in this paper. And finally, it is necessary to point out the importance 
of investment in human capital, as measured by education here, in the process of 
economic growth. In most of the regressions, the rate of education proved even more 
significant than the rate of investment (in physical capital). So, as suggested earlier, it 
is not only the quantity of that “ultimate resource” which matters, but also its quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Rotterdam, July 1987 
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